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DEFINING A UNITARY BUSINESS: ANECONOMISTS VIEW
Abstract
The definition of a unitary businesshas figured prominently
in several recent decisions ofthe U.S. Supreme Court on the
constitutionality of state corporate incometaxes. This paper
employs economic analysis to frame a threepart test of whether a
unitary business exists. Underlying thetests is the notion thata
unitary business exists when separateaccounting cannot
satisfactorily isolate the profits of individualfirms. The first
test is common control. The'second is whether transferpriees on
transactions within the group could bemanipulated or are diifjou1t
to verify or substantial verticalintegration, shared costs,
economies of scale or scope, or otherforms of economic
interdependencemake isolation ofprofits of affiliated firms
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I.Introduction
There is no longer significant disagreement that formulaapportionment
is required to divide the domestic income ofa multistate firm engaged in a
single unitary business among the states in which it hastaxable nexus.1
Separate accounting, whether applied on a geographicor functional basis,
simply does not generally provide a satisfactory division ofthe income of
a unitary business among the various states.2 The reason for the made—
quacy of separate accounting under these conditions, as stated in words
that have become part of the conventional wisdom in thisarea, is its fail—
ure to recognize that the various parts of the unitary business(split
along functional or geographic lines) are "dependentupon or contributory
3 to each other.
Some states respect the legal distinction betweenseparately incor-
porated firms, no matter how closely the various members ofgroups of firms
may be affiliated. These states employ separate accounting for each firm
and, at most, ask whether a given firm is engaged in more thanone unitary
business. Other states look beyond the legal fiction ofseparate incorpor—
ation to ask whether two or more members of agroup of affiliated firms are
jointly engaged in a unitary business. If theyare, they are required (or
allowed) to file a combined rport in order to determine theincome that is
to be taxed by the state in question.4 Unitary combination ispracticed
most notably by California, but increasingly other statesare applying this2.
approach, especially in taxing oil companies.5
-
Taxpayersgenerally argue that combination can result in taxation of
extraterritorial values (prohibited by the due process clause of the U.S.
Constitution), discrimination against interstate commerce (a violation of
the commerce clause), and, when applied on a worldwide basis, violation of
U.S. treaty obligations.6 States, for their part, typically argue that
separate accounting cannot adequately isolate the income of firms engaged
in a unitary business and that combination is required if firms are not to
be allowed to use legal form to reduce taxes artificially, especially
through manipulation of the internal transfer prices required for separate
accounting predicated on legally distinct incorporation. The treatment of
arguably foreign source income and of intercorporate dividends, as well as
the definition of a unitary business, have figured especia.lly prominently
in cases recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court or before it as'this is
written .
Theneed to define a unitary business with clarity and certainty is
readily apparent from even this brief description.8 Indeed, in Mobil the
U.S. Supreme Court stated clearly and unequivocally that "the linchpin of
apportionability ... isthe unitary—business principle,"9 and in Exxon,
ASARCO, and Woolworth, as well as in Mobil, the Court considered explicitly
whether unitary businesses existed)0
-
Whethera unitary business exists in a given instance depends on the
economic realities ——thepresence and strength of the contribution and de-
pendency between the activities of various affiliated firms or parts of
firms. Yet little has been written by economists about the proper test for
a unitary business, at least outside the context of litigation. The pre—
sent paper is an attempt to provide an ob5ective and nontechnical ——andin3.
some respects still preliminary ——discussionof what an economist would
reasonably consider a unitary business to be.
Infocusing onthe definition of aunitary business, I deliberately
set aside important related issues, includingthe general need for inter-
state uniformity in taxingcorporate income and the particular need for
uniformity in determining taxing nexus and inchoosing the apportionment
formula to be applied.1- Moreover, I avoidthe highly controversial ——and
partly noneconomic ——issueof whether unitary combination shouldbe ap-
plied on a worldwide basis.12
Suppose that the ProMax group consists oftwo commonly owned and con-
trolled firms, A and B. Ourconceptual problem is to determine whether (1)
ProMax consists of one unitary businessor (2) firms A and B are ech en-
gaged in separate businesses. The basic test to beapplied is whether,
withina reasonable degree of accuracy,separate accounting can be used to
isolate the individual profits of thetwo affiliated firms. Ifnot, the
twofirms should be deemed to beengaged in a unitary business. To answer
the question we examine various
reasons separate accounting might not
measure profits adequately. Not surprisingly, verticaltransactions and
various forms of interdependence will be foundto lie at the heart of
economic unity. I do not initially discussthe role played by common
ownership and control, which is the subject of the fourthsection. For the
purpose of the second and third sections it will be convenientto assume
that common ownership of firms A and B iscomplete and that there is no
issue of common control.
The definition of a unitary businessadopted here is, to a large
degree, tautological. That is, formula apportionment——andcombination,4.
in the case of mu)tiple firms ——isneeded because, in general, separate
accounting cannot satisfactorily divide income among affiliated firms or
parts of one or more firms engaged in a unitarybusiness.'3 By implica-
tion, then, a unitary business is the smallest division of a firm or group
of firms, the income of which can generally be accurately indicated by
separate accounting.14 The remainder of this paper is an elaboration of
this basic tautology. Of course, there may be instances in which separate
accounting cannot, strictly speaki,pg, isolate the income of individual
firms, and yet the potential error in measurement of income would be so
small that it would be unreasonable to require combination. Thus provision
is made (in the fifth section) for a de minimus test of substantiality.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section dis-
cusses vertical integration and the potential for manipulation, inaécuracy,
or nonexistence of transfer prices. The third section examines vane
other potential types of economic interdependence between firms. TF
fourth section examines the roles of ownership and control and stre
importance of autonomous decision making in the test of unity. The
section discusses the need for a test of substantiality, summarizes
discussion up to that point, and compares my criteria for finding t
unitary business exists with several others, especially that of Jer
Nellerstein, a vocal advocate of a particular, somewhat more restri
but more objective test. The final section briefly compares the tc
unity employed by the Supreme Court in Mobil, ASARCO, and Woolwortl
the criteria I propose.5.
II. Vertical Integration and Transfer Pricing
In the next section we examine a variety ofeconomic interrelations
that might link two affiliated firmstogether so closely that it would be
conceptually impossible to use separate accounting to dividetheir joint
income between them satisfactorily, if theinterrelations are substantial.
In such cases the firms should be treatedas unitary for state tax pur-
poses. In the first part of this section we examinea much simpler case ——
onein which, by assumption, thereare no such interrelations.15 In such
cases the firms involved are not inherently unitary,
since, in principle,
separate accounting could, by assumption, isolate the incomeof the various
firms. Nonetheless, if there is a substantialvolume of transactionsamong
the firms, it may be possible, in the absenceof concerted administrative
action, for affiliated firms to manipulate theprices, fees, or other
charges made for the transfer of goods and servicesbetween them and there-
fore to attribute too much income to low—tax (orno tax) states and too
little to high—tax states.16 Moreover,even under these very restrictive
assumptions of independence of operations theremay he cases where it is
conceptually impossible to isolate the income of thevarious affiliated
firms. Unitary combination isgenerally appropriate if the volume of
interaffiliate transactions in goods and serviceswith no readily deter-
mined value is substantial. Finally,
more far—reaching vertical intégra—
tion may be based on economic interdependencethat renders accuratesep-
arate accounting impossible and leads to afinding of unity,
A. Simple Inaccuracy of TransferPricing
Suppose that affiliated firms A and B eachoperate in one state (A and
B, respectively) and nowhere else. State A hasan income tax and state B
does not. Firm A operates a large couercia1 farmonwhich it raises wheat6.
andhogs. Firm B buys wheat from firm A, mills it, and sells flour in bulk
to bakeries. It also sells some of the by—products of milling for use as
animal feed; firm A buys some of these by—products to feed its hogs. Ex-
cept for common ownership and control there is no other interdependence
between the two firms. Assume for argument's sake that the markets for
wheat, flour, the milling by—products used as animal feed, and hogs are
perfectlycompetitive, so that there are readily identifiable market values
for eachof the four commodities. Finally, assume that the prices of all
other inputs of both firms are also beyond the control of those firms.
Given these very restrictive assumptions, there is no conceptual dif-
ficulty in isolating the income of the two firms.7 But there is also no
difficulty in seeing how transfer prices could be manipulated to shift in-
come from firm A and state A, where it would be taxed, to firm B aiid state
B, where it would not be taxed. Wheat could simply be sold by firm A to
firm B at below the market price, or milling by—products could be sold by
firm B to firm A at inflated prices. A slightly more sophisticated ap-
proach would be for firm A to sell wheat on credit to firm B, charging
interest rates below market rates, or for firm B to sell to firm A on
creditat above market rates)8
There are basically two ways to dealwith this problem. One is to
employseparate accounting, supplemented by a standard of arm's—length
pricing. This is the way international transactions between affiliated
firms are treated under section 482ofthe U.S. InternalRevenueCode. The
otheris to avoid the administrative burden of such an approach by ruling
that substantial intercorporate transactions between affiliates constitute
prima facie evidence that a unitary business exists and that combination ——
andwith it formula apportionment of the income of the two firms ——isap—7.
propriate in such cases.
There can be little doubt that under thehighly restrictive assurnp—
tions of the example just presentedseparate accounting is the conceptually
preferred approach. But once costs of administration andcompliance are
considered, the proper choice becomes less obvious.'9 Theprecision made
possible by separate accounting may simply not beworth the cost of verify—
ing the transfer prices employed in thousands oftransactions between af-
filiates. This conclusion isstrengthened once one adds more realism to
the example.
B. Absence of Arm's—Length Prices
Suppose, for example, that we are dealing withcomponents of automo-
biles manufactured by firm Aexpressly for firm B and sold to no one else,
rather than with the relatively simple set oftransactions outlined above.
(At this point we do not relax theassumption that there is no other inter-
dependence between the firms.) Inthiscase there is noindependently
verifiablearm's—length price to use in auditing transferprices assigned
tothe components, andsurrogatesmusthefound,ifseparateaccounting. is
tobe employed. Troublesome problems also arise invaluing patents that are
not generally licensed, specialized servicesprovided only to affiliates,
and loan guarantees.
The U.S. Internal Revenue Code provides threemethods of determining
transfer prices for tangible property when,as in this example, there is no
comparable uncontrolled price.20 These are (1) resaleprice, (2) cost
plus, and (3) other methods. The resale price methodattempts to compute a
transfer price by deducting the customer'sgross markup (value added plus
profit margin) from the amount realized on resale afterfurther processing.
By comparison, the cost plus method bases the allowabletransfer price on8.
the supplier's cost plus a profit margin. In both cases the problem is to
determine the appropriate markup, something that is generally inherently
impossible to do with precision.2' The regulations provide no guidance in
applying the third (other) method that can he used if neither of these
surrogates for an uncontrolled price provides a satisfactory estimate of
transfer prices.
Implementation of section 482 is notorious for its many difficul-
ties.22 It is hardly surprising that many states have not wanted to follow
the federal government down the road to separat.e accounting and have opted
instead for combination and formula apportionment in instances where a sub-
stantial volume of transactions occurs between affiliated firms.
Though one can have considerable sympathy with this state reaction,
another important question arises: inthesimpler case described in the
first part of this section, should proof of actual manipulation of transfer
pricesbe required for a finding of unity, or is the potential for manipu-
lation enough? (Presumably the conceptual impossibility of accurate trans-
fer pricesfor a substantial flow of products would ordinarily justify a
finding of unity.) On the one hand, unused potential to manipulate trans
fer prices does not result in actual mismeasurement of income. But basing
the test on actual manipulation would meanthatstates would have to per-
form mini—482 audits to see whether manipulation was occurring and would
allow (indeed, encourage) firms to play an audit lottery. Besides that, it
would contribute greatly to uncertainty. All things considered, it seems
that where transactions between affiliates are virtually all in homogeneous
products and occur on commercial terms, including easily verifiable free—
market prices and interest rates, and there is no other important inter—
dependence, separate accounting is appropriate; otherwise, the potential9.
for substantial mismeasurement shouldgenerally he enough to justify com-
bination.
C. Reasons for Vertical Integration
If two commonly owned firms (or divisions withina single firm) were
connected by a flow of goods and paymentsoccurring strictly at market
prices and nothing more, we might wonder whythey were commonly owned. In
fact, this state of affairs is probably quiterare; especially in manufac-
turing, a substantial volume of vertical transactions
probably generally
implies something not captured in marketprices.., namely vertical integra-
tion.23
Oliver Williamson has emphasized savings intransaction costs as an
important explanation of vertical integration. Whenvertical activities in
the production—distribution chain are organized withinone firm, there is
less need to shop around, less difficulty inappraising products and
services, less expense in contracting, morecertainty of supply (and of
markets), and more flexibility in adapting tochanging conditions.24
Williamson argues that contracting via marketsmay be especially dif-
ficult when major investments in highlyspecific fixed assets are required
at various stages in the production—distrjbtj0process or where there is
substantial possibility that product qualitymay be debased; under these
circumstances firms may integrate forwardor backward. Specificity bfas-
sets is important because no one wants to be left"holding the bag" ——when
the bag contains an expensive single—useasset ——ifasupplier or customer
doesnot perform as expected. Vertical integrationcan overcome this im-
pediment based on limited knowledge and fear of treachery.25Similarly,
firms can assure the quality of suppliesby integrating backwards or assure
thequality of distributors by integrating forward andthereby avoid de—10.
basement of quality.26 Advantages of vertical integration based on these
types of savings in transaction costs are difficult to quantify and allo-
cate between the various firms in a group (or divisions within a firm).
Certainly they may not be adequately captured and allocated by transfer
prices, and uncontrolled market prices are, in the nature of things, likely
tobe virtually nonexistent. Ireturn to this point in the surrmaryofthis
section.
Economiesof scale (described more fully in the first part of the next
section) can also make vertical integration attractive. In many areas of
American industry there is room for only a few firms that can fully realize
economies of scale. This leads to at least two (potentially related)
reasons for vertical integration. First, industries with only a few firms
often tend to be characterized by noncompetitive pricing. Where this is
true, downstream (upstream) firms may be able to capture some of the pro-
fits from noncompetitive pricing by integrating backwards (forwards).27
Where this occurs, it is difficult to know how to allocate the extra-
ordinary profits between affiliates via separate accounting.28
Second, vertical integration may sometimes be a defensIve strategy.
That is, suppose that one firm sees its competitors absorbing some of its
formerly independent upstream suppliers, perhaps for reasons such as those
specified above.29 Rather than being left in the precarious position of
relying on the even smaller number of suppliers left after the mergers,
including those owned by its competitors, the firm may decide to absorb a
supplier (or start its own supplying firm or division). Again, profits of
the affiliates may be hard to isolate under these circumstances.
One alleged result of economies of scale that illustrates several
pointsmade thus far figured significantly in the finding of economic unity11.
in the Exxon case. Refining is a highlycapital—intensive link between the
production of crude oil and the distribution of refinedproducts. Because
of the enormous fixed costs and relatively modest
operating costs, it is
crucial to run refineries at near fullcapacity. Therefore, the state of
Wisconsin argued, it is important to assure both reliablesources of supply
and dependable markets, and profits attributable to theDductiort, refin-
ing, and marketing functions of an integrated oilcompany cannot be iso-
lated.30
In a fully competitive environment, thisargument would have little
weight, since crude oil could simply be obtained on theopen market and
refined products could be sold at competitiveprices. But in an imper-
fectly competitive world, avoiding shortages,squeezes, gluts, and so forth
can be vital. ,Even if transfers of crude oil and refinedproducts-commonly
occur at market prices, in such a world, separateaccounting might fail to
recognize the contribution reliable sources of crude oil andoutlets for
products would make to the profitability of the refining function.Similar
situations obviously exist in other industries.
The Supreme Court alsofoundthat other aspects of Exxons operations
suggested a unitary business: centralized purchasing;use of a uniform
credit card system; and uniform packaging, brandnames, and promotional
displays all run from the national headquarters.31Particularly inter—
esting is an exchange agreement, whereby gasoline sold in Wisconsinwas
obtained from another company.32 Though one couldimagine that these
exchanges were carried Out by Exxon's marketing department, in factthey
were arranged by the supply and refining departments,discrediting any
suggestion that the marketing function was not integrated withrefining.
ID. Summary Statement: Manipulation or Synergism?12.
In this section I have identified three "levels" of vertical interac-
tions that could lead to a finding of unity. Of course, these three are
notalways easily distinguishable. First, there are situations in which
standardized products with readily determinable prices pass vertically
between affiliates. In this case the primary issue is whether transfer
prices are being manipulated or for some other reason fafl to reflect
market prices. If no further interdependence is present, such cases are
not inherently unitary, and separate accounting could satisfactorily
isolate the income of the various affiliated firms, since, by assumption,
uncontrolled prices exist. On the other hand, it is easy to understand the
states' preference for.the administrative convenience of formula apportion-
ment in such cases.
More complicated are situations in which vertical transactionè involve
nonstandardized products for which there are no readily known free-market
prices. In such cases tax administrators auditing returns based on separ-
ate accounting must resort to tests such as those provided in section 482
for use when uncontrolled prices do not exist. In this case the argument
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strativeconvenience; in extreme cases accurate separate accounting may
simply not be feasible.
The third level of complication involves such complete vertical inte-
gration that it is basically hopeless to employ separate accounting in the
effort to isolate the income of vertically related affiliates. In such
cases economic interdependence is so great that even if uncontrolled prices
exist, their use may not adequately reflect the contributions of the com-
ponent parts to the income of the entire unitary business. In such cases
formula apportionment is appropriate.13.
This may be a useful point at which to introduce a distinction between
two somewhat different reasons separate accounting may fail to isolate the
income of affiliated firms.33 In the first case the total income of two
firms does not significantly depend on whether or not they are affiliated,
hut the division of income between them for tax purposes may. The simple
vertical transactions described in the first part of this section illus-
trate this case. Sharing the expenses of a constant—cost operation (de-
scribed in the next section) is another example. In both cases we are
dealing primarily with the division between firms of a total amount of
profits that does not depend on whether the firms are affiliated. In such
cases, the failure of separate accounting ——andthe need for unitary com-
bination ——isprimarily administrative, not conceptually inherent. Sec-
tion 482, at least implicitly, is designed to deal with this situation.
In the second case the joint profits of the two affiliated firms are
substantially greater than the sum of the profits of the two firms would be
if they acted independently.34 Among reasons for this phenomenon that we
have already identified are savings in transaction costs (based on speci-
ficity of assets and avoiding debasement of quality) and economies of
scale. Other important sources of economic interdependence that create
this type of synergism are discussed in the next section. In these cases
the firms are conceptually unitary in the sense that it is inherently
impossible to split the joint profits between them with scientific pre-
cision. Separate accounting based on arm's—length pricing rules are bound
to fail under these circumstances.35
The case of automobile components described above could fall in either
of these categories, depending on the facts. Advocates of section 482 pro-
cedures implicitly assume that it falls in the first. Advocates of unitary14.
combination, on the other hand, contend that the prerequisites for applying
a section 482 approach are unlikely to be found in practice.
III. Contribution and Dependence
Thus far we have concentrated on vertical patterns of interdependence.
More controversial is what might he called horizontal interdependence ——
interrelationsbetween affiliated firms in which one is not the customer of
the other ——thatcall for a finding of unity.(Of course, in any given
case, horizontal and vertical interdependence may be found together.) All
the important reasons for a finding of unity based on horizontal
interdependence fall iit the second (synergism) category described in the
last part of the previous section.
A. Interdependence in Supply: Economies of Scale and. Scope
Economies of scale constitute one of the most pervasive potential
sources of interdependence in supply. Such economies exist when output can
be increased by some given multiple (2 for example) by increasing all
inputs by a connon, hut smaller multiple (say by 1.8). Common examples
include those based on the technical relationship between diameter and
area; when the diameter ——ofpipelines, cylindrical storage facilities,
and so forth —isdoubled, capacity is four times as large. This implies
that two equally large and adjacent markets can be served by a trunk
pipeline only some 40 percent (the square root of two, minus one) larger
than that needed to serve one of them. If affiliated firms A and B served
the two markets but shared the joint trunk pipeline, we could not sci—
entifically determine the profit of either, for there is no way of knowing
what fraction of the total cost of the large pipeline (between 41.4 percent
and 100 percent of the cost of a separate pipeline) to allocate to one of15.
the markets and the firm serving it, and howmuch to the other.36
The implications of this examplego well beyond those of an attempt to
employ separate geographic accounting for several firms(and jurisdictions)
served by one pipeline or by commonstorage facilities. Economies of scale
exist in the maintenance of inventoriesthat, from an economic and
mathematical point of view, resemble thosejust discussed. This implies
that two firms acting jointly can maintainan optimal level of inventories
at lower total cost than if each maintained its
own inventories. Again, it
would be impossible to determine theseparate profits of two affiliated
firms following such a course.
If two affiliated firms shareda pipeJine or storage faci]ities or
maintained joint inventories,they might be seen immediately to benefit
from important economies ofscale; this would probably lead directlyto a
finding of unity. What may be less obvious isthat the same theory applies
to inventories of a very important commodity held
by all firms, regardless
of their line of business: cash balances.
That is, two firms with ready
access to the same pool of financial resourcescan economize on the cash
they need to keep in their vaults or in low—interestliquid deposits.37
Fixed costs resulting from indivisibilitjesare a second important
source of economies of scale. Once the initialinvestment has been made in
accounting systems, legal departments, researchlabs, and so forth, it may
be possible to expand their output withoutincreasing their inputs (and
their costs) proportionately. Variousrules of thumb are used by cost
accountants to allocate fixed costsamong firms. For example, if variable
costs can be attributed accurately to the twofirms, fixed costs may be
allocated in the same proportion.Nonetheless, there is no scientific
basis for this or any other allocation of fixed
costs. Thus, profits of16.
individualfirms sharing the facility characterized by fixed costs cannot
be measured accurately by separate accounting.
It is important to note that many economies of scale of this type may
beavailable over only a relatively limited range of output. That is,
there may be economies of scale, for example, in processing credit charges
and patent applications, hut only up to a point; beyond that, these may
essentially be constant—cost activities.38 Where constant costs prevail at
all levels of output, there is no synergistic effect of affiliation; there
is only the need to determine the costs attributable to each of the affil-
iates. Even econondes of scale that are exhausted at a scale far below the
actual scale of operation do, strictly speaking, imply that not all profits
can be split accurately between two firms sharing the fixed facility. But
these unallocable costs may be so small, in relative terms, that they can
safely be ignored without seriously affecting the division of income be-
tween the firms. Where that is true, it would be improper to characterize
otherwise separate activities as part of a unitary business.39 Much the
same thing can he said of economies that may be small in relative terms,
even though they are not fully exhausted at the actual level of operation.
Itmakes no sense to predicate a finding of unity on scale economies that
could not possibly significantly distort themeasurement of incotne.4° In
any given situation the relative importance of economies of scale resulting
from fixed costs ——orfrom other sources ——isan empirical question.
This point is pursued further in the fifth section.
Top—levelmanagement may be one of the inputs to modern corporate ac-
tivity inwhichthe rangeof potential economies of scale based on indivi—
sibilitiesis the greatest.41 Economies of scale in rese.arch and develop—
ment (R and D) and the exploitation of knowledge based on R and D may also17.
lie near this end of the spectrum. The point is not that additional ex-
periments can be conducted with the same set of test tubes and scientists;
indeed, much research may, after a point, be characterized by roughly con-
stant returns to scale. The important thing about research in the present
context, aside from the synergism that sometimes occurs in large industrial
labs, is the fact that once discovered, knowledge can he applied to produce
output ranging from negligible to virtually unlimited. For example, once a
given pain killer has been discovered, one capsule or one billion capsules
can be produced. Similarly, the technology of under water exploration and
development can be used by the petroleum industry to drill one well or one
hundred.
Much of what has been said up to this point in this section can he
reoriented slightly and brought together under the general headingof
economies of scope, a term that has appeared in the economics literature
only within the past decade.42 Such economies exist when the cost of
producing two or more products jointly is less than the sum of the costs of
producing them separately. They arise from the sharing or joint use of. in-
puts; for example, if a given input is imperfectly divisible or has the
property of a public good, once the input is acquired for one use it is
available for others.43 Economies of scope have been offered as reasons
forboth horizontal diversification and vertical integration.
B. Transaction Costs and Horizontal Diversity
The existence of economies of scope sets thestage for one explanation
for the existence of multiproduct firms. In some instances economies of
scope can be realized by a sparate firm that sells services subject to
these economies to other entities. (For example, a firm that owns a pipe-
line might sell transportation services to two separate firms serving18.
nearby markets.) But in others it will be more economical to save trans-
action costs by organizing activities internally (for example, by having
expensive, highly specialized assets owned by one member of a multiproduct
group of firms).
One explanation for the benefits of organization of production and
distribution within firms (or groups of firms), rather than between
unaffiliated firms, emphasizes the savings in transaction costs it
a1lows.4 Following Williamson, Teece has emphasized the role of
"transactions difficulties" in explaining the existence of multiproduct
firms where know—how is an important input.45 Because of the peculiar
nature of information ——"itsvalue for the purchaser is not known until he
has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost" ——
itis difficult for markets to effect its transfer between firms effici-
ently;46 buyers have difficulty in determining the value of information,
and sellers are reluctant to disclose it. These problems are compounded by
the fact that know—how often cannot simply be transferred via b!ueprints or
instruction manuals, because it involves an important element of learning—
by—doing. Markets are most likely to handle the transfer of information
between firms satisfactorily where the information to be transmitted is not
proprietary, the application is not specialized, and transfers are infre-
quent.47 But where information is proprietary, it is used in specialized
applications, and transfers of know—how occur frequently, it is more likely
that new applications will he effected within multiproduct firms or groups
of firms, rather than through market transactions.
Teece identifies technological know—how, transfer of managerial and
organizational know—how, and goodwill (including brand loyalty) as types of
assets where market mechanisms may fail and for which intrafirm transfers19.
are superior to interfirm transfers. The very nature of this argument
suggests that there is no market price for the services being provided, and
that affiliated firms able to benefit from the sharing of such knowledge
will have lower costs than if they were unaffiliated. Therefore the
profits of the individual affiliated firms making joint use of this kind of
information cannot he isolated. If the savings in transaction costs
resulting from internal organization are substantial, unitary combination,
rather than separate accounting, is the proper approach.
It may be worthwhile to emphasize at this point a potentially crucial
difference between this and the previous case of shared costs.48 Some
shared activities may occur at near constant costs or may be ancillary to
the basic operation of a business and sufficiently unimportant in relative
terms that their allocation èould not seriously affect the divisiofl of
income between firms arguably engaged in different businesses; legal or
accounting services may be an example. In such cases, separate accounting
with arbitrary allocation of the shared costs may be appropriate, and com-
bination may produce quite artificial results. y comparison, the impor-
tant feature of some expenses may be not that they are shared but that they
create such interdependence between activities of various affiliated firms
that separate accounting cannot isolate the income of the firms engaged in
joint activities; where this occurs unitary apportionment is required, even
if the expenses are relatively minor.
C. Externalities
External economies and diseconomies, or externalities, exist when the
activities of one firm create benefits or costs for another firm for which
the first is not compensated.49 Examples of external diseconotnies are
legion; pollution in its many forms is the best example. Important exter—20.
nal economies are harder to find. Standard examples include general train-
ing (that is, training that is not job—specific) and the flower gardener
who cannot collect for the benefits the apiary realizes. In what follows I
concentrate on external costs. External benefits are treated at various
other points in this paper. For example, the benefits of advertisingspon-
sored by one firm that spill over to affect the demand for the product of
an affiliated firm (considered further in the fourth part of this section)
can be treated as a special kind of externality. (See also "Reasons for
VerticalIntegration" in the preceding section •for a consideration of
avoidance of debasement of quality as apotentialreason for vertical
integration.)
Suppose that for technologic—geographic reasons firm A is in a posi-
tion to create air or water pollution that adversely affects the ability
(costs) of affiliated firm B to produce or distribute its product.St Under
certain conditions totally unaffiliated firms would reach bargains by which
firm B would compensate firm A to limit its pollution.51 So, by the same
token, might affiliated but autonomous firms reach similar bargains, inde-
pendently of any direction from above predicated on a desire to maximize
joint profits of the ProMax group. In such a case, separate accounting
might well accurately reflect the distinct income streams of the two affil-
iated firms, just as it might in the case of totally independent, unaffili—
ated firms. In other words, the economic interdependence assumed to result
from the pollution would not necessarily justify characterizing the firms
as part of one unitary business. But there is no reason to believe that
affiliated firms that are not autonomous would strike exactly the same bar-
gain as unaffiliated firms. Indeed, the interaffiliate "bargain" on pol-
lution might simply he a sophisticated way of transferring taxable income21.
betweenthe affiliates.
Alternatively, if no such bargain were reached between the affiliated
firms, it might appear that this is prima facie evidence thatseparate ac-
counting would be satisfactory, as it is for affiliated firms wherethere
is uncornpensated pollution. But the ProMax boardmight decide that the
profit—maximizing approach for the group would be to let firm A pollute and
have firm B live with the pollution. Alternatively, the boardof ProMax,
might simply mandate that firm A install pollution abatementequipment or
otherwise avoid pollution in order to protect theposition of firm B, if
that were the lowest—cost approach.52 In either case itappears that a
finding of a unitary business would be proper.
It thus appears that in this case objective evidence tellsus rela-
tively little about whether or not a unitary business exists. Failureto
prevent pollution could he consistent with either totalautonomy of firms A
and B or with a conscious decision that allowing pollutionwould be the op-
timum policy for the group. Conversely, pollutionabatement could occur if
either firms A and B were autonomous but reachedan agreement whereby A
would limit pollution in exchange for compensation,or a higher—level decI-
sion were made that group profits would be higher if firmA would limit
pollution.The issue is confused even further by the fact that effortsto
avoid pollution may hebasedon generally applicable regulations, rather
thanon the goal of maximizing group profits. It may be that in suchcases
the only way to determine whether the firms aretruly unitary is to examine
the records of meetings of the boards of directors and executivecommittees
of ProMax. In the absence of such an extrememove, it may be advisable 'to
take important externalities between affiliates, or effortsto prevent them
that do not have benefits beyond the group, in the case ofdiseconomies, as22.
evidencethat firms are engaged in a unitarybusiness.Of course, as in
the case of other forms of interdependence, trivial externalities should
not he allowed to generate a finding of unity.
B. Interdependence in Demand
Interdependence can occur on the demand side of firms' transactions,
as well as on the cost side. This can clearly be true when the outputs
produced by two firms are vet; itrorig complements or very strong substi—
tutes. Thus, for example, one might argue that it would be difficult to
separate the profits of affiliated firms operating in the following pairs
of industries producing complements: flashlights and batteries; small
boats and outboard motors; automobiles and gasoline.53 ut there is some-
thing wrong with this argument as stated thus far. The problem is that
market structure has not been considered. Suppose that both flashlights
and batteries were manufactured and sold under perfectly competitive con-
ditions. The products of the two industries might, indeed, be complemen-
tary; but the products of all firms in one of the industries would he in-
terchangeable. Thus no single firm producing flashlights could substan-
tially alter the demand for the batteries produced by its affiliate, say by
altering the price of its own product. Only if neither of the industries
were perfectly competitive (that is, only if neither faced a perfectly
elastic demand curve) would complementarity between products interfere with
theadequacy of separate accounting to isolate the profits of the two
firms. Two important empirical and judgmental questions must therefore be
answered: how great isthecomplementarity between the particular products
ofaffiliated firms, and how much complementarity is required for a finding
that a unitary business exists?
Thisisa useful place to consider the role of advertising. One ir—23.
portant purpose of advertising -—inaddition to moving the demand curve
out——isto differentiate the advertised product from others and thereby
reduce its elasticity of demand. But brand awareness generated by adver-
tising will often carry over to (or span a range of) related products.
(This is, in a sense, a form of jointness or external benefit.) If adver-
tising simultaneously creates the same brand identification for both bat-
teries and flashlights, the two demand curves are not totally elastic or
mutually independent and separate accounting cannot isolate the profits of
two firms producing flashlights and batteries that are linked by advertis-
ing but are otherwise distinct. That is, where brand loyalty based on
advertising is important, interdependence cannot be handled adequately by
simply attributing part (or even all) of the advertising expense to one of
the activities; the activities should be treated as unitary.
-Ofcourse, the potential for advertising to unite activities does not
stop with products that are complementary in use. For example, General
Electric's brand indentification and product loyalty can be expected to
span an entire range of otherwise quite unrelated household appliances..54
Much the same thing can be said about substitutes as about comple-
ments. Though they are not perfect substitutes, coal, fuel oil, wood, and
sweaters are all means of staying warm. Suppose that one firm owned a
woodlot and its affiliate manufactured woolen sweaters. Since both of
these industries are fairly competitive, it seems unlikely that the demand
curves faced by the two affiliates would be highly interdependent. Thus
there seems to be little reason to combine operations of the two firms in
one state tax report, despite the substitutability between wood and wool at
the industry level.
Consider now the situation of coal and fuel oil. Here it seems much24.
more likely that there might he enough interdependence at the firmlevelto
warrant a finding that separate accounting could not isolate the profits of
two related firms operating in the t.'o fields. But it remains an empirical
question whether the important interdependence occurs on the demand side.
On balance, it seems far more likely that a finding of unity in this case
should be based on shared technology and the savings of transaction costs
discussed in the second part of this section.55
Market sharing is a final example of interdependence in demand. Sup-
pose that two affiliated firms control a significant fraction of output in
a given industry. Their profits may be greater than if they were unrelated
(or even affiliated, bit autonomous) firms competing with each other.
Moreover, which of the two firms actually supplies various markets, and
therefore the division of taxable income among the states,. may be largely
under the control of the central management of the affiliates. In such a
case it seems only proper to treat the two firms as part of a unitary busi-
ness56
Yet another form of interdependence deserves brief mention, though it
-—.. .4 .... 4. . 4 4 noesnot nc neaciy uner eicner suppiy or ceTnanc Inceroepencence. sin—
deed, it has one foot in each.) This is reciprocal buying. Suppose that
affiliated firms A and B have no transactions with each other and exhibit
none of the forms of interdependence discussed thus far. But the ProMax
board determines that firm A should buy from a third unaffiliated firm C
only if firm C buys from firm B. (Presumably such an arrangement would
make sense only if none of the three firms operated in a competitive in-
dustry, a point we take as given in what follows.) Clearly such a practice
is likely to prevent the books of account of firms A and .B from accurately
stating their respective incomes; indeed, it may be theoretically25.
impossible to determine the income of the individual firmsunder such
circumstances. A conclusion that a unitary business existsis proper if
purchases (sales) resulting from reciprocal buying constitutea large share
of the total purchases (sales) of firm A (firm B).
E. Risk Sharing
Sharing of risks is another form of interdependence thatmight warrant
a finding that a unitary business exists. Moreover, itemphasizes that in
some contexts the test for unity must be placed ina particular time frame.
Suppose, for example, that a given oil company thatowns well—established
reserves operates in several states. One interpretation ofthe facts might
be that (leaving aside.home officeexpenses, other shared costs, problems
of transfer pricing, and various other complicationsraised elsewhere in
thispaper) separate accounting might he employed to determinethe produc—
tionincome realized in each state, sincepetroleum has a readily discern-
ible market value., But this approach wouldgenerally be appropriate only
if a very short—run view of the questionwere taken or if the discovery of
petroleum involved no risks.57 Such a "snapshot" view ofan uncertain and
knowledge—intensive activity may fail to give adequateweight to the inter-
dependence between present activities in a given state andresearch and
exploration conducted previously or elsewhere.
To see this, suppose that we were talking aboutjurisdictions smaller
than states and that nature was such thatonly one well ——eithera produc-
ing well or a dry hole ——couldbe drilled in each jurisdiction, with the
chances of success being totally random and independentof what has occur-
red in neighboring jurisdictions. Would we wantto attribute all income of
the producing wells to the jurisdictions wherethey are located and none to
the "dry—hole" jurisdictions? I think not. If, forsome reason, investors26.
could invest in only one well, on an all—or—nothing basis, there might be
relatively little exploration and, consequently, litt]e production.58 In
reality, however, firms diversify by drilling in a larger number of places,
relyingonthe "law of averages" to give them a mixture of successes and
failuresthatapproaches the global probabilities. Moreover, success is
not totally random: firms learn about geological structure from each well,
regardless of whether it is drilled in the same state. That being the
case, it seems inappropriate not to treat a firm with winners and losers
unevenly scattered across jurisdictions as a unitary business.59
When combined with savings in transaction costs in the transfer of
knowledge (discussed ir the second part of this section) and the potential
for manipulation of transfer prices, the above argument assumes special
significance. Suppose that a given manufacturing firm (A). undertakes
research only in a high—tax state but sells or leases for a nominal amount
all the resulting patents for a nominal amount to an affiliate (B)
producing in a low—tax state. In the absence of combination, firm A would
deduct the cost of both successful and unsuccessful research in reaching
taxable income. But firm B would realize the profits resulting from the
research. This is, essentially, what the states claim happens because of
the federal tax incentives for investment in Puerto Rico.6° They under-
standably argue that the two firms in this example should be considered
engaged in a single unitary business.
An extreme version of the argument that sharing risks is one attribute
of a unitary business would lead to the conclusion that many conglomerate
corporate groups should be subject to combination. In this view
diversification based on a low covariance of earnings would be enough to
demonstrate unity. I am not comfortable with this view. First, conglomer—27.
ation may provide no diversification that the individual investorcannot
duplicate in the market. If it does not, it does not reduce the group's
cost of capital and there is no gain from affiliation.6' Second, even if
pooling of risks does reduce the group's cost of capital, I am not sure
that that justifies a conclusion that the income of various otherwise
separable firms cannot be isolated.62
IV.CentralizedDecision Making and Unitary Business
A. Common Ownershp and Control
Ownership, along with operation and use, is one of the tests of a uni-
tary business known as.the "three unities" enunciated in Butler Brothers v.
McColgan and condoned by the U.S. Supreme Court.63 Majority ownership is
usually thought to be necessary for a finding that a unitary business
exists, and some observers have suggested that it should also be suffi-
cient.64 Although theremay he muchtobesaidfor such a straightforward
rule fromthe point of view of simplicity, certainty, and uniformity, from
an economic point of view common (majority) ownership is neithernecessary
nor sufficient for the existence of a unitary business.65
If the division of income between two companies is to be manipulated
to produce a misleading picture of the firms' respective incomes for tax
purposes, it is generally necessary that the two firms be under common con-
trol. Where common control is lacking, economic interdependence ordinarily
should not lead to a conclusion that a unitary business exists, since it
can generally be assumed that those responsible for running the various
firms will look to the profits of their respective firms. The important
question is the meaning of "control" in this context.66
The distinction Fama and Jensen make between decision management and28.
decision control is particularly useful.67 Whereas management involves
initiation of proposals and implementation of those that are ratified, con-
trol involves ratification and monitoring of proposals initiated and imple—
inented by management. In this terminology, representatives of owners, as
residual claimants, exercise control but not management in large open
corporations. The crucial question for our purpose, then, is whether
common ownership—control (in the Fama—Jensen sense), when combined with
substantial vertical transactions or other forms of interdependence, is
enough to justify a finding of unity, or whether common (centralized)
management at the operational level is required.68
It appears to me that common control (as Fama and Jensen use the term)
is the relevant concept and that a requirement of common operational man-
agementgoes too far. Further light can be shed on this q.uestion by con-
sidering the maxim that "a condition of near—decomposability will carac—
terize strategic and operating decisions in a well—managed firm."69 The
general office is responsible for strategic decisions and operating deci-
sions are lodged in the managers of semiautonomous entities. Williamson
notesthat, "a presumption that the general office favors profits over
functional goals is warranted."7° The implication is that in a unitary
business central (controlling) management makes decisions with an eye to
the profits of the whole, not the parts.71
Actual patternsof control should be examined inassessing hether or
notaunitary business exists; these patterns may be suggested by patterns
of ownership, but they may not be. The existence of a majority of common
board members or of comrnoii top—level management would be especially in—
structive. Some of the more aggressive states and the Multistate Tax
Commission (MTC)have even argued that examination of minutes of meetings29.
of hoards of directors and executive committees isneccessarv if common
control, as manifested in pursuit of common objectives, isto be
discovered. 72
B. Autonomy and Central Control
The autonomy of various affiliated firmsor divisions within single
firms has been raised in the Exxon, Woolworth, andASARCO cases. This is
conceptually quite proper, for the top management of a firm (orgroup of
firms) interested in maximizingaggregate profits can generally concede
autonomy to its constituent divisions (or firms) only undervery
restrictive conditions.73 These conditionsare essentially those under
which we would probably find that the divisions (firms)were not involved
in a unitary business. If the conditions under whichattempts by
divisional managers to maximize the profits of theirdjvjsons will
maximize the profits of the entire firmare violated, top—level management
interested in maximizing profits will either abandondecentralized decision
making or adjust the price signals sent to lower—levelmanagers in such a
way as to induce behavior that will maximize profits for the entire firm.
In either event, we would conclude that there isa unitary business. This
is, of course, as it should be, since we wouldexpect decentralized de-
cision making based on unadjusted transfer pricesto lead to the
maximization of the profits of the entire firmonly if separate accounting
accurately measures the profits of hidividual d1vis1n5. Whatthen are
some of the reasons decentralized decision maldog aimedat maximizing
divisional profits may fail to maximizeaggregate profits?
First, decentralized management cannot be expected toact properly in
the face of declining costs resultiing from economies ofscale in the use of
shared facilities.74 Economies of scale would leadto a natural monopoly30.
internalto the firm. Pricing of the decreasing cost activity to maximize
profits of the division responsible for it would cause it to be underutil-
ized. Profit maximization for the firm requires that internal decisions be
based on transfer prices set equal to marginal (incremental) cost. But if
this is done, divisions responsible for activities subject to declining
costs will incur accounting deficits, since average cost exceeds marginal
cost.
Second, external costs (and benefits) flowing between divisions are
likely to lead to improper decisions, in the same way that pollution (and
external benefits) prevents the achievement of maximum social welfare. In
the absence of Coase—type bargains, lower—level managers will make the
proper decisions only if pricing signals are adjusted from above to reflect
externalities.
Third, ifthereis interdependence in production or in demand for the
output of the various divisions (or possibilities for profitable reciprocal
purchases), division managers may not take due account of the effects of
their actions on the profitability of other divisions.75
Fourth, if their outlook is restricted to their own (perhaps artifi-
cially limited) sphere of activity and the profits of various divisions
havea low covariance, managers may be more risk—averse than is appropriate
from the group's point of view. Top—level management may need to adjust
signals to lower—level management orotherwise induce more risk taking.
Finally,and in a somewhat different vein, if transfer prices deviate
frommarket prices (or marginal costs) because they are being manipulated
to minimize taxes (or for other reasons), there is no reason to expect that
the profit—maximizing actions of lower—level managers will lead to global
profit maximization.31.
All these (and other) examples of the potential failureof decentral-
ized decision making can be overcome (at least inprinicple) by centraliz-
ing certain decisions or by adjusting the pricing signalsto which lower—
level managers respond. Either centralization ofimportant decisions or
significant adjustments in pricing signals should thus beconsidered prima
facie evidence that a unitary business exists.76Conversely, one prerequi-
site for a finding that a unitary business doesnot exist would seem to be
heavy reliance on transfer pricing based on marginal costs andvirtually
total autonomy from central direction.77
V. Summary Statement of Criteria
The analysis of the section II and IIIsuggests that there are two
reasons that are conceptua]ly distinct, though often foundtogether, for
determining that the members of a group of commonly owned and controlled
firms are engaged in a unitary business. First,substantial transactions
between affiliated firms can make itadministratively difficult, and per-
haps impossible, to verify that transfer prices are notbeing manipulated
to shift income between affiliated firms, and therefore betweenjurisdic-
tions. This problem is most likely to be significantwhere there are ver-
tical transactions in goods and services withno uncontrolled market price,
and it becomes insuperable as vertical integration becomescomplete. Se—
cond, various kinds of interdependence may make itconceptually impossible
to determine the income of the individual firms.Particularly important
are shared costs and other economies of scale and scope and shared
know—how. Though interdependence exists particularly invertically
integrated production and distribution, it can also explain horizontal
diversification and demand a finding of unity.32.
Neither of the difficulties described above is likely to be a signi-
ficant source of misstatement of income for tax purposes unless affiliated
firms are under common control, for in the absence of common control, af-
filiated firms can be expected to pursue their own objectives, much as
totally unaffiliated firms do. Thus it appears that a finding of common
control should be one sine qua non of a finding of unity. Conversely,
total autonomy of the individual firms would generally indicate the absence
of unity. Common ownership is usually, but not always, indicative of
common control.
A. Substantiality
For shared costs to justify a finding of unity the costs must be
substantial enough that how they are allocated between firms could ser-
iously affect the calculation of profits of the various corporate entities
sharing them. The same is true of interdependence and intercorporafe
transactions; they must be substantial enough that they could cause sep-
arate accounting to fail badly to isolate the profits of the various enti-
ties.78 In other words, it seems essential to have a de minimus provision
that prevents even commonly controlled affiliated firms with only insigni-
ficant amounts of shared expenses, interdependence, or intercorporate
transactions from being swept into the net of unitary combination.
The following example illustrates the need for such a rule, in the
case of shared costs. Suppose that firms X and ? both operate in states A
and B, only the former of which levies a corporate tax. Suppose further
that the formula used by state A would result in that state's taxing the
following fractions of the income of the two firms under separate account-
ing and under combination: firm X, 66 2/3 percent; firm'?, 25 percent;
combined, 50 percent. Suppose that each firm has sales of $2,400 and that33.
expenses directly allocable to firms X and Y are $2,000 and $1,LLOO,respec-
tively. Expenses that cannot be allocated are $200. (This couldalso be
the possible error in transfer pricing; see below.) Thustotal profits of
the two firms are $1,200.
If the two firms file a combined return, state A willtax $600 of this
income. If separate accounting is used, the allocation ofthe unallocable
expenses becomes important. Suppose, however, that theseexpenses are at-
tributed entirely to firm Y, the one with the leastpresence in state A,
the income tax state, as indicated by the apportionment formula.(This
allocation maximizes the tax base of state A underseparate accounting.)
Firm X would report $267 (66 2/3 percent of $400) of incometo state A and
firm Y would report $200 (25 percent of $800). The total isonly $467, or
substantially less than under unitary combination. Even if the unallocable
expenses were claimed as a deduction by neither firm, under separate ac-
counting the total taxable income in state A would be only $517, still less
than under combination. Combination of the high-income firm withless
presencein state A with the low—income firm withgreater presence in state
A increases the base apportioned to state A bymorethanthe amount of tax
base at stake in the arbitrary allocation of the unal]ocableexpenses.
Thoughthis example was constructed to produce an extremeresult, its
lesson is of general applicability. Minor amounts of unallocableexpenses
——withnothing more ——shouldnot be allowed to force use of a combined
report.79 Much the same argument can be made forpotential errors in
transfer prices. If transactions between affiliated firmsare so insigni-
ficant or the conceivable range of transfer prices isso small that no
imaginable amount of manipulation could seriously affect the division of
income via separate accounting, unitary combination should not berequired.34.
These de minimus rules should not be interpreted as emasculating the
unitary principle. They are intended to apply when there are minor un—
allocable costs, small potential errors in transfer prices, or insigni-
ficant amounts of interdependence, but little or no other interdependence.
In many instances the contribution to group profits cannot be adequately
recognized simply by adjusting transfer prices or the allocation of shared
expenses. Examples might include major benefitsof technological know—how,
brand identification, unique managerial capabilities, and vertical inte-
gration. There generally are not well—defined market prices in these
cases, and even if there are, the increased profits such arrangementsmake
possible may be so considerable that separate accounting cannot adequately
deal with them.
B. A Three—Stage Test
The above line of reasoning suggests a three—level test of unity. At
the first level a finding of complete managerial autonomy to act on the
basis of market—determined pricing signals for inputs and outputs (or
transfer prices approximating them) would constitute presumptive evidence
that a single unitary business does not exist. On the other hand, absence
of autonomy, as evidenced by coimnon control, would suggest that a second
level of investigation is warranted. At this second level of investigation
the manipulation of transfer pricing, the impossibility of determining ac-
curate transfer prices, or vertical integration would lead to a finding
that a unitary business might exist and would lead to the third level in-
vestigation into substantiality. So would important shared costs, other
economies of scale and scope, and other forms of interdependence that make
isolation of the profits of individual firms impossible. Commonly con—
trolled firms between which there were few if any shared costs or other35.
economies of scale or scope, only minor amounts of transactions for which
transfer pricing could be an issue, and no other important interdependences
would not be found to be unitary.
This three—level test can be presented schematically as in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE
If test 1 reveals that there is no common control, a finding of unity can-
not be supported. Only if there is common control do we go to test 2,
whether there are shared expenses, other economies of scale or scope,
intragroup transactions, or other economic interdependence. Test 3 dis-
tinguishes cases in which minor interdependence or allocation of relatively
small amounts of income and expense are involved from those in which prob-
lems of shared expenses, transfer pricing, and interdependence are so vital
that separate accounting cannot be used; this test must also be answered
affirmatively for a finding that there is a unitary business.
Any test of unity must provide a yes or no answer to the cuestion of
whether combination is appropriate. A determination that two or more firms
are "a little bit" unitary or "mostly" unitary cannot be employed to sug-
gest that a little bit of combination or a lot is proper.8° This is un-
fortunate, because the need for an all—or—nothing answer raises the stakes
involved in reaching the right answer. It a)so makes it especially de-
sirable to he able to specify conceptually clear and relatively objective
tests of what constitutes a unitary business.8'
It might be relatively easy to legislate simple quantitative standards
for some kinds of shared expenses and intercorporate transactions. It
should also be possible to recognize whether common control exists in given
situations, though specifying the test in law might he more difficult. But
it seems almost impossible to legislate a quantitative standard for theFigure 1 Three—Stage Test for a Unitary Business
-
Test1: Is there common control?
If No: If Yes then lyTest2:
Nonunitary Are there shared expenses, economies of scale or scope,
intragroup transactions, vertical integration, or other
economic interdependence?
If No: If Yes, then appj Test 3:
Nonunitary Are these substantial?
If No: If Yes:
Nonunitary Unitary36.
type or amount of interdependence of various types that would be required
for a ruling of unity.82 Here there seems to be no substitute for subjec-
tive consideration of the facts in individual cases.83
C. Comparison With Other Tests
Among the questions states have asked in determining whether groups of
affiliated firms are engaged in unitary businesses is whether the various
firms share insurance, legal, accounting, and tax preparation services;
purchasing; employee benefit plans; and training.84 In and of themselves,
these do not appear to me to be adequate predicates for a finding of a
unitary business. Many of these activities probably confer little benefit
(savings) on the group that would riotbeavailable to the individual
members. Only if there are substantial economies of scale, other sources
of saving (for example, quantity discounts from common purchasing) or
other reasons separate accounting would fail to isolate the income of the
members is a finding of unity in order. If, for example, the liability for
employee benefits became the joint liability of the group, it might be
impossible to untangle the profits of the various firms. At best, an
affirmative answer to any of these questions should he only the starting
point for further investigation of the economic reality of the matter; it
should not be dispositive.
Whether firms are in a similar line of business is another commonly
mentioned test of unity that is suggestive but should not be dispositive.85
If vertical integration or market sharing exists, or if there are other
forms of interdependence, affiliated firms in a similiar line of business
are clearly unitary. But if 'there is simply common ownership of two firms
operating in totally different markets with no important economic
interdependence, there is no unitary business. This is true even ifthere37.
is counon control, so long as there is no coordination of poflcies.It may
be difficult to know how to split the cost of central managementbetween
the firms. But in most cases the magnitudes are not large enoughthat the
split could significantly alter the resultsof separate accounting.
Other tests are likely to he much more indicativeof a unitary busi-
ness under certain circumstances. For reasonsdescribed earlier, joint
advertising and other common aspects of public relations,including logos
and stationery, intercompany finance and loan guarantees, interchangeof
expertise, and coordination via shared officersand directors may make it
impossible to rely on separate accounting. These arealso discussed brief-
ly in the next part of,this section.
D. An Alternative Test: Operational Interdependence
Itappears that the criteria suggestedhere are broad.ly consistent
with thoseproposed by Jerome thoughthey may be some'what
more judgmental and may result in a findingof unity in some instances
where Hellerstein's wouldnot.87 He has suggested that "a business is not
unitary unless interdependent basic operations arecarried on to a
substantial extent in different states by the branches or subsidiariesthat
comprise the controlledenterprise."88 The italicized words show agreement
that common control is necessary and that interdependencemust be
substantial.89 e appear to differ about whether sharing of certain
activities that are not part of basic operating functionsin and of itself
could, in principle, lead to a finding that a unitarybusiness exists.
Hellerstein argues that:
The non—basic operating functions of a business, such as
providing managerial, accounting, personnel, legal, patentor
similar services, centralized advertising, pension andbene—
fit plans, and the like, or furnishing capital, important
though they be to the profits of the enterprise,were not the38.
types of activities that gave rise to, or that necessitated
apportionment. In determining the profits of a branch or
subsidiary, the costs of such internal, non—basi" •.'perations
can, and often are, regularly determined and charged on a
cost, gross receipts or similar basis. Obviously, the fair-
ness of these charges needs to be scrutinized closely, but
they present nothing like the virtually insurmountable prob-
lems of determining arm's length transfer prices on sales of
raw materials, or goods manufactured by one branch or con-
trolled corporation and sold to another, or on resale by a
mercantile company of purchased goods. Patents and know—how
created and owned by one segment of the enterprise, secret
processes, or the results of research done by one segment of
the business and made available to the others, are more elu-
sive and more difficult to pin down. Unless they are basic
to the enterprise, these items can also be charged on a cost
or similar basis, or if there is licensing to nonaffiliated
interests, ona comparable basis.90
As a practical matter, I would share Hellerstein's view on the items
listed in the first sentence, with the possible exceptions ofmanagement,
advertising, and finance. As noted in the previous part of this section,
it- is generally unlikely that any savings resulting from sharing the other
expenses listed or any possibility of manipulation of intercorporate
charges for them could be great enough to distort materially the
calculation of income of the various component firms. On the other hand,
basing combination on them could cause serious distortions of the division
of income, in the way illustrated by the example presented in the first
part of this section. The same may often be true of advertising; it is
unlikely that advertising ordinarily looms large enough to matter much.
But where advertising is an important expense or brand identification
spills over from one division or affiliated firm to another, itmay not be
enough simply to charge for advertising costs.9' Like technical knowledge,
brand identification based on joint advertising may justify a finding that
a unitary business exists.
Finance also causes me to worry, since manipulation of interest rates39.
isa troublesome area in the administration of the federal tax on multi-
national firms. This concern is compounded by considerations that a sub-
sidiary of a major corporation may be able to borrow on substantially more
favorable terms ——fromits parent or externally ——thanif it were totally
independent. Finally, it appears that one must look carefully at the type
and amount of control exercised by central management, along the lines
suggested in section IV. This may or may not be indicative of a unitary
business.
In its brief to the Supreme Court, counsel, for the Container
Corporation, relying on Hellerstein's writing and its reading of the
decisions in ASARCO and Woolworth, requested that a substantial flow of
products between affiliates be made the bright—line test for the existence
of a unitary business. Such a test would, of course, be much more
restrictive that that proposed in this paper, since under it the various
other types of interdependence described earlier could not be used to
justify a finding of unity.92 Whether it would actually be less
restrictive that Hellerstein's is difficult to know, given the difficult of
definingprecisely the term basic operational interdependence, but it
appears thatit wouldbe.
VI. Mobil, AARCO, and Woolworth
Itmay be worthwhile to examine briefly the Mobil, ASARCO, and
worth cases to see how the U.S. Supreme Court's apparent views on what
constitutes a unitary business compare with those presented here.93 I con-
centrate on the tests of unity the Court seems to have applied, rather than
on whether it applied them correctly.94 Thus I base the discussion on the
descriptionsand appraisals of the factual situations found in the majority40.
and minority opinions.95
A. Mobil
In Mobil the U.S. Supreme Court provideda description of a unitary
business (and the need for the concept) thatappears to be totally con-
sistent with what has been written above.
Separate accounting, while it purports to isolate
portions of income received in various States,may fafl
to account for contributions to incomeresulting from
functional integration, centralization ofmanagement,
and economies of scale. Because these factorsof
profitability arise from the operation of the business
as a whole, it becomes misleading to characterize the
income of0he business as having a single identifiable
'source.
The Court seems tQ have found a unitary business inMobil largely by
default, since Mobil did not offer any seriousargument that no unitary
business was involved.97 To the extent this istrue, one can hardly fault
the Court on that part of its decision.98 Itseems, however, rather far—
fetched to believe that Mobil is engaged ina unitary business with most of
the firms listed in footnote 9 of the dissentingopinion by Justice
Stevens, absent evidence that it controls these firms(mostly public util-
ities), in which Mobil had only minority interests.99At most, it would
appear to be engaged in a unitary business only with the three firms listed
in footnote 5 of the majority opinion, threewholly owned subsidiaries and
a joint venture (ARANCO), in which it had a 10percent share. In these
cases one has little difficulty believing there was aunitary business,
even though ARANCO raises the special issue of how to treatjoint ventures.
B. Woolworth
The majority also appears to have applied principlesconsistent with
those outlined above in the Woolworth case. It went intoconsiderable de-
tail in documenting the absense of central control("eJach subsidiary per—41.
forms these functions autonomously and independently of the parent com-
pany"100) and the lack of important shared expenses, intercorporate
actions, or other interdependence ("'oolworth's operations ere not
functionally integrated with its subsidiaries"'0' and "There is no flow of
international business. Nor is there any integration or unitary operation
l02.
The minority opinion by Justice 0Connor gives three reasons for dis-
agreeing with the majority decision: frequent corunicaticn heteen the
managements of the parent and the subsidiaries, approval of major financial
decisions by the parent, and the publication of consolidated financial
statements.103 There is no suggestion that the frecuent corunications
either invalidated the judgment that the subsidiaries were independent of
the parent or otherwise rendered the firms unitary. The third objection
(consolidated statements) seems to lack substance. Only the second seems
to hold any possibility of being important; but even here there is no sug-
gestion how parent oversight of debt and dividend policy caused distortion
of the division of income between Voolworth and its foreign subsidiaries.
L. ASA.KL)
The Court considered that the relationship between ASARCO and Southern
Peru posed the closest question of the five affiliates considered in this
case. ASARCO owned 51.5 percent of Southern Peru and bought 35 percent of
its output. Even so, the court found that (1) ASARCO did not control
Southern Peru and (2) intercorporate transactions occurred at prices over
which the two firms had no control.104 It thus found no evidence of a
unitary business.
In the other parent—subsidiary relations under examination, the Court
found that ASARCO owned 52.7 percent of a subsidiary but had never elected1L2.
anofficer, was prohibited by a consent decree from voting it stock in two
companies in whichitheld roughly 34 percent interests, and had been re-
quired by the fexican government to divest itself of 51 percent of the sub-
sidiary's stock.105 In none of the four instances did the Court find that
ASARCO exercised control over the subsidiaries, all of whom were found to
operate independently. ioreover, the Court found no otherevidence of a
unitarybusiness and explicitly rejected the view that a uritarvbusiness
exists if stock is "acquired, managed, or disposed of for purposes relating
or contributing to the taxpayer's business,"106 noting that "this defini-
tion of unitary business would destroy the concept."107
The dissenting opi,nion, again delivered by Justice O'Connor, argued on
three grounds that ASARCO was involved in a unitary business with its sub-
sidiaries: ASARCO used its knowledge of the nonferrous metals industry to
decide whether to invest in these firms;108 its investment may have
involved interim investment of idle funds from its own primary business;109
and it had effective operational control over at least three of the com-
panies.11° The first of these argumentsappears to have no substance. The
second is more difficult to appraise hut is not one that I find convin-
cing.111 The third also seems lacking, except perhaps in the case of the
}iexican subsidiary. At any rate, it is interesting that even the dissent
emphasized control, not mere majority ownership.
D. Appraisal
It appears that the Supreme Court agrees with the need to examine the
facts in a given situation to determine whether a unitary business exists.
It said in Exxon, "The court looks to the 'underlying economic realities of
a unitary business,' and the income must derive from 'unrelated business
activity' which constitutes a 'discrete business enterprise.'"312 In43.
ASARCOitsaid, "(T)he application of the unitary—business principle re-
quiresineach case a careful examination both of the way inwhichthe
corporateenterpriseis structured and operates, and of the relationship
with the taxing state.'413 The Court's language leaves considerable lat-
itude for alternative interpretations, but the issues to be determined
appear to be roughly those described in Figure 1 above.114 Unfortunately,
the answers to most of the crucial questions are not easily quantifiable.
As Walter Hellerstein has written, "While one can derive some guidance for
the future from the Court's discussion of the facts, the Court's approach
in ASARCO seems to invite an endless stream of litigation over the requis-
ite flow of goods, services, personnel and so forth, that arenecessary to
constitute a unitary business."115FOOTNOTES
*The author wishes to thank Jack Hirshleifer, F.M.Scherer, Roger
Sherman, and Carl Shoup, as well as the participants in theconference, for
Comments on an earlier version of this paper. He is,however, solely
responsible for the opinions expressed here.
1. This sentence is deliberately worded to preclude theneed to con-
sider two issues, the treatment of arguably foreignsource income and the
test of taxable nexus, in order to allow us to focuson a third, the def-
inition of a unitary bustness. On the first ofthese, see George N.
Carison and Harvey Galper, "Water's Edge Versus WorldwideUnitary
Combination," in This Volume, chapter,andthe references cited there.
Nor do I consider either the choice of the formula to beused In
apportioning income or the definition and measurement of the "factors" in
the formula. On these questions, see Peggy B.Musgrave, "The State
Corporate Income Tax: PrInciples for the DIvIsIon of TaxBase," This
Volume, chapter
2. If separate accounting could be appliedsatIsfactorily on a
geographic basis, it could substitute for formula apportionment.Func-.
tional separate accounting would presumably need to besupplemented by
formula apportionment to divide the income attributed to thevarious
functions amongthestates.
3. This statement of the problem is found in George T. Altmanand
Frank P4. Keesling, Allocation of Income in State Taxation (NewYork:
Commerce Clearing House, 1946), p. 101: "The essential test iswhether or2.
not the operation of the portion of the business within the state is
dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the businessoutside
the state. If there is such a relationship, the business is unitary."
Virtually identical wording is contained in Edison California Stores,30
Cal.2d. 1472 (19147) at 1181, the classic case that gave this test judicial
sanction. For a brief history of the development of the unitaryconcept,
see, for example, Benjamin F. Miller,"Worldwide Unitary Combination: The
California Practice," This Volume, chapter ,orWilliam D. Dexter, "The
UnitaryConcept in State Income Taxation of Multistate—Multinational
Businesses," The Urban Lawyer 10, no. 2 (Spring 1978):181—212.
4 In a combined report income of the firms engaged in the unitary
business is added together and intercorporate transactions betweenthe
firms (most notably dividends) are eliminated. The income of the unitary
group is then apportioned between the taxingstate and others on the basis
of the factors (e.g., payroll, property, and sales) of theentire group.
For the distinction between a consolidated return and a combined report,
see Miller, "Worldwide Unitary Combination."
5. See Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the
Cha1rrnanHouseCot on Ways and Means, Key Issues AffectingState
Taxation of MultijurisdiCtionlal Corporate Income Need Resolving,
(Washington: D. C.: U. S. General Accounting Office, July 1,1982) for a
recent compilation of state practices in this area.California practice
is described in detail in Miller, "Worldwide Unitary Combination."
6.Thisand the next sentence of the text are not intended to provide
a complete catalog of business grievances orstate responses. For more
complete discussions of these grievances and responses, seethe papers by
Jerome R. Hellerstein, "State Taxation Under the CommerceClause: The3.
HistoryRevisited," all in this volume. Carison and Ga].per, "Water's
Edge;" and Walter Hellerstein, "Dividing the State Corporate Income Tax
Base: Developments in the Supreme Court and the Congress," all in this
volume. While stateandcorporate interests are generally aligned as
describedin the text, there are instances in whichfirmswish to employ
unitary combination and states attempt to deny it; see especially the
peculiarcase presently before the U.S. Supreme Court (Chicago Bridge and
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., U.S. No. 81 —3149,Oct. 1981), in
which Chicago Bridge and Iron has taken up a case abandoned by the state
of Illinois in attempting to prevent Caterpillar from employing worldwide
combination.
7.The cases decided during the Court's 1980 and 1982 sessions are
Mobil Oil Corp. v Commissioner of Taxes, 14145 US. 425, 10.0 S. Ct. '1223
(1980); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 14147 U.S. 207, 100 S.
Ct. 2109 (1980); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of the
State of New Mexico, _U.S., 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982); and ASARCO Inc.
v. Idaho State Tax Comm. _U.S.,,_,,, 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982). Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board (U.S. No. 81-523, Oct. 1982),
presently before the Court, is the first case (aside from Chicago Bridge
and Iron v, caterpiiiar, in which the record is quite skimpy) to reach the
Court in whiôh the legality of worldwide application of unitary
combination is explicitly challenged.
8. Carlson and Galper, "Water's Edge," n. 11, state: "The major
remaining controversy in the domestic area surrounds the question of what
constitutes a unitary business operation." Walter Hellerstein, "Dividing
the State Corporate Income Tax Base," expresses a similiar sentiment:
"Since the existence of a unitary business is an essential predicate to az.
state's apportionment of income generated by that business, the criteria
fordeterming whether a business is unitary are crucial."
9. 445 U.S.at ]437.
10. See the citations in note7 above.It may be well to note at this
point that Exxon involved primarily the question ofwhetherseparate
accounting could be used to determine the functional breakdown of
operating incomeamongthe various divisions of Exxon, a single
corporation.By comparison, the other three cases involved the question
of whether nondomiciliary states could include intercorporate dividends in
the apportionable income of a taxpayer. The Court ruled that the answer
in each case hinged onthe existence of a unitary business.
11. For an earlier expression of myviewson such issues, seeCharles
E.McLure, Jr.', "TowardUniformityin Interstate Taxation: A Further
Analysis,"Tax Notes Vol. 13,no. LI (July 13, 1981): 51-63. Ihave argued
elsewhere, in Charles E. McLure, Jr., "The State Corporate Income Tax:
Lambs in Wolves' Clothing," in The Economics of Taxation ed. Henry J.
Aaron and Michael J. Boskin (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution,
)I.A .ftA...1 .. I JJ/JjJ. 3f ?U,aflu.Ln 2OJLW1L2 I. 'Ji J1IULL! LU
FederalSystem," in Canadian Tax Journal 30, no. 6(Nov.-.Dec.1982):
8110—859 and in Tax Assignment in Federal Countries, ed. Charles E, McLure,
Jr. (Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations,
forthcoming) that states should not attempt to tax corporate income, in
part because of (1) theinherent difficulties of dividingincome among
states,(2) the demonstrated unwillingness of states to achieve an
acceptabledegree of uniformity in definitions of taxable incomeandmeans
of dividing it among states, let alone tax rates, and (3) the geographic
distortions inherent in origin—based taxes that are not uniform across5.
states. Thuswe are, at best, dealing with what I considera second—best
situation.
12. See, however, the papers by Carison andGalper, "Water's Edge,"
by Miller, "Worldwide Unitary Combination," and by WalterHellerstein,
"Dividing the State Corporate Income Tax Base" and thecomments by
Franklin C. Latcham, Norman J. Laboe, and David R.Milton, all in this
volume, and references given there. Ofcourse, the tests of economic
unity presented here are, in principle, as applicableto multinational
groups of affiliated firms as to wholly domesticgroups it combination is
to be applied on a worldwide basis.
13. Note the words of the California Supreme Courtin Butler Bros.
v. McColgan 17 Cal.2d. 667—68 (191M): "It is only if itsbusiness within
this state is truly separate •and distinct... sothat the segregation of
Incomemaybemade clearly and accurately, that theseparate accountlng
methodmay properly be used." The entire discussionof thispaper is
framedin terms ofdeterminingwhether formula apportionment (and
combination,in thecase of legallydistinct affiliates), rather that
separate accounting,.sappropriate for the division of business income
betweenstates. It appears,however, that the same test of unity would be
applicablein determining whether, in theabsence of combination,
intercorporatedividends should be taxed to the payeecorporation, asin
Mobil,ASARCO, and Woolworth. Note 80below argues that if two firms are
found to beengaged inaunitary business, combinationshouldbe applied;
dividendsshould not simply be included in apportionableincome, as in
Mobil.
I shouldnotethatInthetext of the versionofthe paper
presented attheconference, which has been extensively revised, but not6.
altered substantively, the following paragraph precedes this one:
The discussion that follows is predicated on the view
that the goal of state tax policy in this area is (or
should be) to taxcorporateincome where itoriginates.
VariousSupreme Court pronouncements about the illegality
of taxing extraterritorla]. values leads one to believe
thatthe Court agrees. Inthis view of things, formula
apportionmentis a necessary evil forced upon us by the
inherent difficulty of using separate accounting to
divide the taxable income of a unitary business among the
various jurisdictions in which it .s earned.
*JeromeHellerstein based his conference comments, which follow this
paper, on that paragraph and also relied on it in his "The Basic
Operations Interdependence Requirement of a Unitary Business:A
Replyto Charles E. McLure, Jr.," Tax Notes 18 no. 9: 723—31. I
have omi.tted the above paragraph in revising the paper for
publication,since upon relection Ifeel that what it says is not
really germane to the issue at hand, and, indeed, detracts from
consideration of the central topic of the paper, defining a unitary
business.Myreasoning is explained further in "Ctitle to be
determined)" Tax Notes, forthcoming.7.
14. The repeated use of "ingeneral" and "generally," in
combination with "accurately" or"satisfactorily," in these
sentencesis intended to indicate that thepresence of the
characteristics of a unitary business describedhere creates a
presumption that separate accounting will not isolatethe income of
the constituent parts of a unitary businessand that formula
apportioent must be employedinsuch cases. It is notproposed
thatseparate accounting could be used to overturnthis
presumption, except in those cases in which theobstacles to
isolation of the Income of thecomponents are so minor that they
wouldbe coveredby the de rninimus provisions discussed insectIon
Vbelow. For a statementof the California presumptionin favor of
unitarytreatment over separate accounting for thetaxation of
--
affiliatedfirms, see Miller, "Worldwide Unitary Combination."'
15.Peggy Musgrave, in "The State Corporate IncomeTax," also
drawsthisdistinction.
"Theneed for combining firma into theso—called unitary business .. arisesunder .. . twosets of circum- stances. The first occurs wherethe firms arein a positionto manipulate their accounts so asto shift accounting profits ...Thesecond situation arises where there is structural linkageamong the firms which
renders the separatIon of their profits anarbitrary procedure .. .Itis to be noted that this second
situation provides the more fundamental rationalefor
combination. In the absence of these structuralinter— dependencies, the need for combination merely restson the lack of administrative capability forenforcing arm's—length pricing.
This distinction helps to explain thereasoning that may lie behind the
following statement by the staff of the CaliforniaFranchise Tax Board in
Senate Committee on Finance, "Staff ObservationsRegarding Income Tax
Provisions of Legislative Proposals," StateTaxation of Interstate8.
Commerce,Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 93rdCong.,1st sess., Sept. 18 and 19 1973, p. 229, quoted in
Carlson and Galper, "Water's Edge": "The use of a combined report [unitary
method]for determining income is not based upon the concept that members
of a unitary business have not acted at arm's—length. It is used because
separate accounting, regardless of its mathematical accuracy, does not
properly reflect the income of a unitary business."
16. Of course, transfer prices may be manipulated for reasons other
than shifting taxable income between states. For our purpose what matters
is the possibility that income of the individual firms may be mismeasured,
not why ——oreven whether -—transferprices are being manipulated. Any
inaccuracy of transfer prices, whether due to deliberate manipulation or
not, is reasonfor concern, if itis substantial. We also ignore the
possibilitythat different transfer prices maybe reported in different
states,something made easier (and perhaps legal) by the failure of the
statesto adopt uniform tax laws and to audit firms jointly.
17. Note that even here there could be difficulties, for example, if,
_._l.____. I.._ £ __ _.......J — £ JLiL LA) JI.4L UU1}J L.LJLL, I.LL L1d.LU '.LWILIJULI t,UVd aiit1e;see
alsothe first part of section III.
18. Implicit in this example is the assumption that both firms face
the same opportunity cost for funds in the capital market. If this is not
true, interpretation becomes more difficult.
19. Note that firm A could sell to an unrelated third party at an ar-
tificially reduced price at the same time that firm B made an equivalent
purchase from the same party under identical terms (plus a small
commission). This subterfuge would shift income from firm A to firm B, but
would be more difficultto spot thansimple use of artificially low9.
transferprices.
20.I.R.C. regulation l.1482—2(e)(1).
21.Jack Hirshielfer, "On the Economics ofTransfer Pricing," Journal
of Business 30 (July, 1956): 175 notes thatwhere two integrated firms are
each other's only supplier and customer, theoptimal transfer price is the
marginal cost (including normal return to capital) of thesupplier. But
the marginal output, by assumption,yields no economic profit, and this
rule for profit maximization says nothing aboutthe division of
inframarginal profits between the two firms,something that is important
fortax purposesanddependson the entire cost schedules of the two firms.
Mote also that since all the activities inthe wheat—hogs example are
assumed to be competitive, none is yieldingmore than a normal return to
capital,at least in the long run. Asthe discussion of distortjons
allegedto result from the use of one formulain all circumstances (for
example, in the Container Corporation's brief)indicates, it is the
existence of arguably different profitability——relativeto payroll,
property, sales, or whatever else enters the apportionmentformula —-in
varIous actIvItIes or locations that makes theproper definition of a
unitarybusiness important. Moreover, verticalintegration may create
savingsthat arenot captured by any of'these approaches; see also the
third and fourth parts and of this section.
22.See, for example, "Multinational Corporations andIncome
AllocationUnder Section Z182 of the Internal RevenueCode," Harvard Law
Review89, no. 6 (Apr. 1976): 1202—1238; ComptrollerGeneral of the United
States, Report to the Chairman House Committeeon Ways and Means, IRS
Could Better Protect U.S.TaxInterests in Determining the Income of'
MultinationalCoryoratlons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GeneralAccounting10.
OfficeSept. 30, 1982); Geoffrey John Harley, International Division of the
Income Tax BaseofMultinational Enterprise, (Ph.D. diss., University of
Michigan LawSchool,1980;Boulder,Cob.: Multistate Tax Commission,
1981); and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 1979) and
literature cited there. Note, however, that whereas the Comptroller
General is critical of transfer pricing, as applied by the IRS, the OECD
strongly endorses the arm's—length approach and would permit the use of
formula apportionment only if it is consistent with arm's length
principles. For more on this, see Carlson and Galper, "Water's Edge."
23. On the nature and advantages of vertical integration, see any
intermediate—level textbook on industrial organization, such as F. M.
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1980), pp. 88—91, or Roger Sherman, The Economics of Industry
(Boston: Little Brown and Co., 19714), pp. 161—63, and references therein.
In whatfollows we do not discuss such obvious technological reasons for
verticalintegration as the combination of the various hot—metal operations
in steel making. Of course, the economies involved in such cases would
render isolation of profits via separate accounting impossible.
214. SeeOliverE. Williamson, "TheVerticalIntegrationof Production:
Market FailureConsiderations," American Economic Review 61, no. 2 (May
1971): 112—23. At this point we discuss only vertical integration,
somewhatartificially postponing until section IIIthediscussion of
similar Influences that can lead to horizontal diversification; the two
will often be found together. See also note 1414 and literature cited there.
25. Oliver E. Williamson, "TheModernCorporation: Origins, Evolution,
Attributes,"Journal of Economic Literature 19, no. 14 (Dec. 1981): 15145—146,11.
identifies the simultaneous existence of bounded rationality and
opportunism as the source of difficulties in contracting: "IHiuman agents
•.differfrom economic man .. . inthat they are less competent in
calculation and less trustworthy and reliable in action." Williamson would
therefore"assess alternative governance structures in terms of their
capacities to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously
safeguarding against opportunism."
26. Williamson notes that much of the success and failure ofattempts
at vertical integration inthe nineteenth century can be explained in terms
ofthree characteristics: economies of scope, asset specificity, and
externalities in demand (the potential debasement of quality) ibid.,pp.
1551_5Z1.Economies of scope are described in first part of section III
below.
27. See Sherman, The Economics ofIndustry, pp. 167-69. -'
28.This is a possible reason for difficulties in knowing the profit
marginsto use inconstructing arm's—length prices noted in the second part
ofthis section.
29. BesIdes inducing Oil firms to manipulate transfer prices to
realize as much income as possible at the crude oil stage, the provision of'
percentage depletion in the tax code (now endedfor large integrated
companies)encouraged vertical integration of'refinersinto exploration and
production, reducing the availability of supplies to nonintegrated
refiners. See Soberer, Industrial Market Structure, p. 91 and references
cited there.
30. 100 S. Ct. 2121 (1980), quoting testimony of an Exxon senior vice
presidentwho had contended during hearings on divestiture that Exxon was
unitary. For a theoretical case for vertical integration in a somewhat12.
different context of uncertain supply, see Kenneth J. Arrow, "Vertical
Integration and Communication," Bell Journal of Economics 6, no. 1 (Spring
1975): 22—59.
31. It would be interesting to know to what extent these involve
relatively minor joint costs whoseallocationcould not possibly distort
themeasurement of income significantly and to what extent they truly
create interdependence that suggests unity. See also the discussions of'
interdependencein section III and of quantitative substantiality in the
first part of'theconcluding section.
32. The purpose oftheseexchanges wasapparentlyto save transpor-
tation costs;see 100 S. Ct. 2115 (1980). There is no suggestion of'
"reciprocal buying" in the sense used in the fourth part of section III.
But it may be that such exchanges are a natural defensive response-to the
small—numbers environment in which the oil companies operate. They allow
the companies to hold each other hostage, so that a competitors denial of
suppliesin one market can be counteredwith denial in other markets.
33.Seealso note 15 above.
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used"in determining unity is whether or not the earnings of the group have
been materially greater because of affiliation than they would have been if
theyhad operated separately."
35.For the present purpose, comments by Jack Hirshleif'er in
"Economicsof the Divisionalized Firm," Journal of Business 30 (Apr. 1957):
105—107 on the profitability of' abandoning a division are particularly
relevant. He notes: "rT]heapparent profit (or loss) of' anydivision
willnot equal the change in total profits for the firm as a whole when
the operations of that division are considered incrementally" (p. 108).13.
36.Each of the two firms might market inonly one state, with the
shared pipeline being the only interdependence between them.If one firm
ownedthe pipelineand carried the other's product for a fee, or ifa third
affiliated firm owned the pipeline,itis not obvious what transfer price
to employ, especially if there are no comparable uncontrolledsales.
Leaving aside the basic problem noted in the previous note,a case could be
madefor. either average cost or marginal cost. Thus neitherstate could
accurately determine the income of either firm.
37. This line of reasoning might seem to have been more persuasive be-
fore the development of money market instruments in whichexcess balances
can be placed for periods as short as one day. But the fact remains that
the possibility of pooling financial requirements can generateimportant
savings.
38. Economies of scale generally give rise todecreasing costs-'
(average costs that fall as output increases). Bycomparison, constant
returns to scale (e.g., doubling Inputs doubles output)generally imply
constant average costs.
39. If the savings from joint activity are so small, onemight then
ask why the firms bother to share the facilities. In suchcases there may
be other even stronger unitary ties. .Thebest examples must be in information; sincecrowding does not
occur,a given coat of obtaining information can be spread over an
arbitrarily large quantity of output. In making this argument we mustbe
carefulnot to decide that affiliates held together by the kinds of
economiesof transaction costs based on proprietary information discussed
in the next part of this section are not unitary just because shared costs
are small. This caveat is explained further there.14.
J•For a discussion of the usual ranges over which economies of' scale
exist, including those of' management, see Soberer, Industrial Market
Structure, pp. 811—88.
42. This literature is largely attributable to W. J.Baurnol,J. C.
Panzer, and B. ID. Willig. See Elizabeth E. Bailey and Ann F. Friedlander,
"Market Structure and Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic
Literat*re 20, no. 3(Sept.1982) for a recent survey of that literature,
including the contributions of Baumol, Panzer, and Willig.
43. Ithardly seems necessary to note that in extreme cases of' joint
supply(e.g., refining of crude oil into gasoline, kerosene, and various
other products), it would be hopeless to attempt to employ separate
accountingto determine the profits attributable to the various products.
1414Theseminal article is B. H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm,"
Economic Journal Il (Nov. 1937): 386—405. See also OliverE. Williamson,
"VerticalIntegration;" Robin Marris and Dennis C. Mueller "The
Corporation, Competition, and the Invisible Hand,"Journal of' Economic
Literature 18, no. 1 (Mar. 1980): 32—63; Richard E. Caves, "Industrial
Organization, Corporate Strategy and Structure,"Journal of Economic
Literature 18, no. 1 (Mar. 1980): 64—92; and especially Williamson, "The
ModernCorporation." In this lastarticle Williamson notes that in the
absenceof' savings in transaction costs transfers willbe organized by
markets, rather than within firms, because scale economies may bemore
easilyrealized (ifthedemand of' any firmis small relative to the minimal
optimaloutput), markets can aggregate uneorrelated demands to achieve
sharing of' risks, and markets may achieve economies of scope ifvarious
firms do not need all services that can be provided more cheaply together
thanseparately (p. 1547).15.
Zj5SeeDavid J. Teece, "Economies of Scope andtheScope of the
Enterprise," JournalofEconomic Behavior and Ornization 1 (1980):pp.
223—47.
'46.This fundamental paradox of information isusually attributed to
Kenneth Arrow. This quotation is from Kenneth J.Arrow, "Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," The Rateand Direction of
InventiveActivity:Economic and Social Factors (Princeton: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1962), p. 615.
'47. See Teece, "Economies of Scope," pp. 230-31or Oliver E.
Williamson, "Transactions—cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations," Journal of Law and Economics 22 (Oct. 1979): 233—61,
'48. See also thediscussion of the fourth part of section II.
'49.Households can also generate externalities, andthey can benefit
from them or be harmedby them. Because ofthe object of the present
discussion, that is ignored. The usual result is that externalitiescause
economic resources to be nhlsallocated, in the sense that too fewresources
are devoted to activities generatingexternalbenefits and too manyto
actvt1es causing external costs. For more on the natureof external
economies (benefits) and diseconomies (costs) and theirtendency to cause
market failure, see any intermediate—level textbook ingovernment finance,
such as Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, PublicFinance in Theory
and Practice, 3d ed. (New York: McGraw—Hill, 1980),chaps. 3 and 311. At
this point we consider only technological externalities (thosethat involve
costs or benefits to society, as well as to the firm). But for thepresent
purpose, pecuniary externalities (those that cause the expenses of the
other firm, but not the costs to society, to be greateror less) are
equally relevant.16.
50.It may, for example, be upstream or upwind. For analytical
convenience we concentrate on the case where the potential for damage is
asymmetrical (unidirectional), to minimize the likelihood that the firms
would simply agree to limit mutual damage to each other.
51. See R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and
Economics 3 (Oct.1960):,_4Z4 and the voluminous literature it has spawned,
including D. M. G. Newberry, "Externalities: the Theory of Enviormental
Policy," in Public Policy and the Tax System, ed. G. A. Hughes andC.H.
Heal, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), pp. 106149 and workscited
there. The market solutIon stated in the text would occur only If property
rights were such that firm A enjoyed the legal privilege of freely
disposing of its wastes, unless paid by firm B not to do so. If, by
comparison,the law gave firmB the right toclean air andwater,firmA
might compensate firm Bto accept some pollution. In either event, under
theCoasian view the level of pollution would probably be similar, but the
distributIon of income between the firms would be different.
52. If the ProMax board acts in either of these ways, the external
costsare "internalized."Whenthis occurs theresidual amountof
pollutionis presumably set at what the ProMax board considers the optimal
level from the group's point of view.
53.Seealso note 75below.
5l• It isinterestingto note that onthefirst day of the conference
atwhich this paper waspresented I received a mass mailing from the
Presidentof Mobil Oil Credit Corporation, encouraging meto apply for a
credit card from Montgomery gard, one ofMobil'ssubsidiaries. One must
wonder whether, in such a case, separate accounting can accurately Isolate
theincome ofthetwo firms. Many unaffiliated firms have also recently17.
engagedin joint promotional efforts (forexample, Disneyworld and Eastern
Airlines).But in such instances commercialarrangements and market
transactions determine the division of costs andincome between
participants. For similar arrangements between affiliatedfirms, the
division of costs may be set by top—levelmanagement and separate
accounting may not accurately split the resulting profits.
55. See Teece, "Economies of Scope," for a discussionof how
proprietary technological information might be transferred withinfirms (or
between affiliates) engaged in the petroleumindustry and in geothermal
energy,nuclear power, or coal mining.
56.Thisargument Is developed more fully in Charles E. MeLure,Jr.,
"Operational Interdependence Is Not the Appropriate 'Bright Line Test'of a
Unitary Business ——AtLeast Not Now," Tax Notes 18, no. 2 (Jan.1Q, 1983):
107—110. Note that there is no presumption that centralmanagement'
determines shares in output only with an eye towardminimizing state taxes.
57. This is, essentially, the view underlying thesupport for geo-
graphic separate accounting for the oil industry inMcLure, "Uniformity in
Interstate TaxatIon." For a very brief earlier statementof the argument
in the text, which was based on an examplesuggested by William Dexter, see
Charles E. McLure, Jr., "State Corporate IncomeTaxes," in State and Local
Financeinthe '80s, ed.George Break (MadIson:University of Wisconsin
Press, forthcoming).
58.We might anticipate an objection to the entire lineof reasoning
based on risk and diversification: if individual investorscan diversify
away risk by holding a portfolio of investments whose risks areuncorre—
lat.ed, there is no social benefit from diversification within a firm.It
seems, however, that this has little to do with the basic question athand,18.
whetherseparate accounting should be used to measure the income of affil-
iated firms (or divisions) engaged in risky ventures in different states,
or they should be treated as unitary businesses for state tax purposes.
59. This line of reasoning seems to have played a part in Superior Oil
Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, where the California Supreme Court said:
"[Ejach producing well in a particular state is the end product of
interstate activities which may involve many other unproductive wells in
many other states" (60 Cal., 2d ii6 [1963]). It is also part of the argu-
ment by W. J. Baumol in his testimony against Alaska's use of geographic
separate accounting for the oil industry (Superior Court for the State of
Alaska,Third Judicial District, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State of Alaska,
No. 3AN—79—1903 Civil and State of Alaska V.ExxonCorp., No. 3AN—80—15142
Civil.) Of course, it has little force if there is enough exploration in
each state to produce adequate diversification. Baumol also emphasizes
thateconomies of' scopein activities conducted inthelower 148states,but
benefitingdiscovery and production in Alaska, including research on
technologies for exploration and production, make it impossible to isolate
profits from Alaskan operations.
60.See also, James Nunns's discussion of Steven H. Sheffrin and Jack
Fuicher, "Alternative Divisions of the Tax Base: How Much Is at Stake?" in
this volume. The situation differs, of course, in that under federal law
separate accounting Is used to split income between Puerto Rico and the
rest of the country, whereasin ourexample formulaapportionment wouldbe
appliedto the respective incomes of firm A and firm B.
61. For a survey of thecry and evidence in this field, see MichaelC.
Jensen,"Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science 31 (Autumn 1972): 357—398. For a brief summary, see19.
Scherer,Industrial Market Structure, pp. 1014—107.
62. Note that in contrast to the case of shared fixedcosts considered
earlier,where each firm faces coststhat are lower because average costs
declinewith quantity, in this case costs to each affiliateare lower, but
presumably constant or rising with quantity.
63. 17 Cal. 2d 6614 (19141); 315 U.S. 501 (19111).
614. Eugene F. Corrigan, "Toward Uniformity inInterstate Taxation,"
Tax Notes 11, no. 11 (Sept. 15, 1980): 507—114, wouldmake majority owner-
shipprimafade evidence of the existence of aunitarybusiness, and P.
Musgrave, "The State Corporate Income Tax," seems to beleaning in that
direction.Frank M. Keesling, generally recognized as the fatherof
combinedreporting, has retreated from his earlier view that he could
recognize a unitary business and has written in "The Combined Report and
Uniformity in Allocation Practices," Seventh Annual Report of the-'
MultistateTax Commislon, (Boulder, Cob.: Multistate TaxCommission, June
30, 19711), p. 112, "I am inclined to the view that all income fromcommonly
ownedbusinessactivities should be combined and apportioned without in-
quiring as to whether such activities are unitary or separate in nature."
65. Carlson and Galper, "Waters Edge," note that theinterpretation
of control under section 1482 of the Internal Revenue Codecan be quite
broad. I.R.C, regulation l.1482—1(a)(3) states that theterm "includes any
kindof control,direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and
however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of thecontrol which
is decisive, not its form or the mode of its exercise."
66. It Is hardly novel to note that ownership andcontrol are not
necessarilyidentical. A variety of institutional arrangementsprovide
control without ownership. For example, under terms ofdebentures,20.
creditorsmayeffectivelycontrol a corporation, even though they do not
own a majority of Its stock. (There is little advantage in inquiring in
the present context whether under these circumstances debt instruments take
on the character of ownership claims.) Moreover, firms sharing majority
boards could engage in manipulation, even if not commonly owned. In what
follows we ignore these possibilities. An especially important question is
how to treat joint ventures where control is vested in a smallgroup of
corporate owners, no one ofwhichhas majority ownership. Insuchcases a
findingof unity may be well founded, despite lack of majority ownership.
A conference celebrating the fiftieth anniversaryofEerie and Mean'sThe
Modern Corporation and Private Property, which emphasized the separation of
ownership and control, washeld at the Hoover Institution a week after the
conference at which this paper was presented. The proceedings of that
conference are forthcomingina special issue of the Journal of Law and
Economics.
67. See Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership
and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, forthcoming.
68,ThevarIety of (often unclear) meanings given to terms that are
virtually synonymous in common usage confuses discussion in this area. It
appearsthat when the Supreme Court refers to "centralized management," it
has in mind centralized control, in the Fama-Jensen sense. The context
should indicate the meaning of terms used in this paper.
69. This quotation Is from Oliver E. Williamson, "Organizational Form,
ResidualClaimants, and Corporate Control," Journal of Law and Economics,
forthcoming.
70. Ibid.
71. Miller, "Worldwide Unitary Combination," quoting the California21.
court, notes, "[I]t is the parent's control and supervision over 'major
policy matters' that counts."
72.For example, in an Oregon case, Multistate Tax Comm.v. Dow
Chemical Co., No. 1835 (Or. T.C. 1982), the MTC has beengranted access to
minutes of meetings of board committees of DowChemicalCo.
73. A standard part of most courses in applied microeconomics isa
demonstration that under certain conditions householdsattempting to maxi-
mize their welfare and firms attempting to maximizeprofits will produce
outcomes that maximize social welfare. If those Conditionsare not met,
the hedonistic instincts of households and entrepreneurswill generally not
gratuitouslyresult in achievement ofthis outcome. A standard
nonmathematical presentation is found in Francis M. Bator, "TheSimple
AnalytIcsof Welfare Maximization," American Economic Review 147,no.1
(Mar.1957): 22—59. Most intermediate—level textbooks on rnicroeconomjcs
alsopresent this argument. An analogous argument can be made about the
advantages of decentralized decision making within a firm. See, for
example,William J. Baumoland Tibor Fabian, "Decomposition, Pricing for
Decentralization and External Economies," Management Science11, no. 1
(Sept. 19611): 1—32. For an earlier treatment, seeHirshleifer, "Economics
of the Divislonalized Firm." In what follows Itake as given the parallel
objectivesof the firm and the divisionmanagers to maximize the profits of
the firm and of the divisions, respectively. I do not otherwiseaddress
the agency problem of how the central management of the firmcan induce its
divisional managers to share its objectives. On this,see, for example,
Stephen A. Ross, "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal#sProblel,"
American EconomicReview 63, no.2 (May 1973) or Marvin Berhold,"A Theory
ofLinear Profit—Sharing Incentives," Quarterly Journal of Economics85,22.
no.3(Aug.1971). The remainder of this section is writtenin terms of a
firmand its divisions. Analogous reasoning applies to a group of
affiliated firms and the affiliates.
VL In what follows, behaving properly is used as a shorthand wayof
saying that profit maximization by division managers leads to profit max-
imizationby the firm. It is interesting to note the simplifying
assumptions on which Hirshleifer bases his initial analysis of the proper
prices to use for transfers within a vertically integrated firm:
Unless stated otherwise, we shall assume that both
technological independence and demand Independence apply
between the operations of the two divisions.
Technological independence meansthatthe operating
costs of each division are independent of the level of
operationsbeing carried onby the other. Demand
independence means that an additional external sale by
either division does not reduce the external demand for
the products of the other. ("Economics ofTransfer
Pricing," p. 173; emphaSis in original)
Thus Hirshleif'er initially explicitly assumes away the first three problems
listed in the text and then reintroduces them.
75.Hirshielfernotes that "cost interdependence between products is.
almost a necessary condition of'divisionalization,'that is,the
devolutionofdecision—makingauthority among autonomous 'profit centers'
."("Economicsofthe Divisionalized Firm," p. 96.)Similarly,on
interdependence in demand, he writes, "A firm producing both cameras and
photographic film should consider, in setting itspricesfor cameras,
the demand for film" (p. 99).
76. In Exxonthe Supreme Court speaks of"an umbrella of centralized
managementand controlled interaction" 100S. Ct. at2120 temphasis added].
77.Wehave argued above that the existence ofminorshared costs,
externalities, sharing ofrisks,and soon, should not lead to a conclusion23.
ofunity. The reasoning of this section would be that if interdependence
of this type is felt by central managementtobe so unimportantthat
divisions aregivensubstantial autonomy despite its presence,thereis a
strong case against a finding of unity.
78. Thus Miller, "Worldwide Unitary Combination," quoting the
California Board of Equalization, notes, "Implicit in either test, of
course, is the requirement of quantitative substantiality."
79. Wherethiswould otherwise occur, perhaps firms should be given
the option of simply filing separate returns and taking no deduction for
such shared expenses in calculating taxable income they report to states
that require unitary combination. Similarly, states requiring unitary
combination could allow each firm with taxable nexus the optIon of setting
a value on transactions with affiliates (within a reasonable range) that
maximizesits tax baseinthe state, rather than requiring itto filea
combined report. This is notmeantto be an exhaustive consideration of'
theform safe—haven rules such as this might take. It is intended to
support the view that minor difficulties with separate accounting should
not force unitary combination that might lead to quite artificial results.
80. As hasbeensuggested elsewhere, for example, in Jerome R.
Hellerstein,"Allocation and Apportionment of Dividends andthe Delineation
ofthe Unitary Business," TaxNotes,111, no. 11 (Jan. 25, 1982): 160 n. 112,
only the proportionate parts ofjoint ventures might be combined with their
corporate owners. But that is really a different matter. For an argument
that combination of less than wholly owned subsidiaries, as currently
practiced, taxes extraterritorial income, see Norman Laboe's discussion at
Benjamin Miller's "Worldwide Unitary Combination" in this volume.
81. eased onarguments presented inthis paper, I have suggested in2.
"OperationalInterdependence" that the Supreme Court should not adopt a
flow of products as the bright—line test of a unitary business, as
requested in the Container Corporation's brief. Yet one can hardly deny
the benefits of' a conceptually clear test of whether a unitary business
exists.I have little sympathy with the view quoted by CarisonandGalper:
"[T)he proposal that each state publish the criteria to be applied in
determining whether a particular business is unitary, without major
clarification, would cripple if not destroy the concept ...Wedo not
believe that thestates should be required to lock into a definition that
overa period of time may be unrealistic" ("Water's Edge," n. 135).
82. This difficulty is compounded when we ask how patterns of shared
costs, interdependence, and intercorporate transactions would be aggregated
in a single quantitative test.
83. Thus Miller, "Worldwide Unitary Combination," writes of California
practIceindetermining whether a unitary business exists, "tI]t involves a
subjectiveexamination of a variety of criteria."
84. Among the many places such lists of characteristics commonly
attributed to unitary businesses may be found are Miller, "Worldwide
UnitaryCombination," and the questionnaires intheappendices to Revised
Procedures for Determining a Unitary Business: The States' Response to
ASARCO and Woolworth (Washington, D.C.: Federation of' Tax Administrators,
Dec. 1982), Research Memorandum 5117, mimeographed.
85. This test is included in the regulations promulgated by the MTC.
86. See, for example, Hellerstein, "Allocation and Apportionment."
Forearlierstatements in thesamevein, seeJeromeR. Hellerstein, "Recent
Developments in State Tax Apportionment andtheCircumscription ofUnitary
Business," National Tax Journal 21, no. 14(Dec.1968):1187—503, and"The25.
Unitary Business Principle and Multicorporate Enterprises: An Examination
of the Major Controversies," The Tax Executive (1975): 313—329, and Jerome
R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State and LocalTaxation:Cases and
Materials, l4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1978), pp.
5 12—20.
87. Note, however, that interaffillate transactions conducted at
market prices would not lead to a finding of unity under my criteria,
whereas they could under Hellerstein's.
88. Hellerstein, "Allocation and Apportionment," p. 165 (emphasis
added).
89.We do, however, use "interdependence" slightly differently.
Hellerstein includes intragroup transactions in this term.
90. Hellerstein, "Allocation and Apportionment," pp. 165—66.
91. One must wonder,forexample, what would be a fair price to impute
to the appearance of the Exxon tiger in advertisements for Exxon office
equipment or to Mobil Credit's endorsement ofMontgomeryWard mentioned in
note511 above.
92. It is interesting to note that this bright—line test might
actually exclude the express companies (and their modern equivalents) to
which the unitary concept was first applied! For a critique of the
Container position, seemy"Operational Interdependence." Jerome
Hellerstein has replied in "The Basic Operations Interdependence
Requirement of a Unitary Business."
93.1 do not comment on Exxon, which involved a vertically integrated
firm that posed a far clearer case of unitary business.
911. I should, however, make one general comment. I believe that the
finding that a unitarybusiness exists should imply that combination is26.
required. It is logically inconsistent to argue that dividends flowing
within a unitary business should be taxed to the recipient as part of its
apportionable income, without combination, as wasdonein Mobil and
attempted by the states in ASARCO and Woolworth. For further elaboration
onthis view, see MeLure, "Uniformity in Interstate Taxation." Thus I
believe that the Court's now oft—repeatedIdentification of apportionabil—
itywith a unitary business, while adequate in the context of a single
firm, should ideally have been stated as follows in a multifirm context:
"The linchpin of combination, and therefore apportionability ... isthe
unitary business concept"(underlined words added).
95.Note, however, the following perceptive comment by Walter Heller—
stein, "Dividing the State Corporate IncomeTaxBase": "While It may be a
matter of small moment, except to the parties, whether the majority or the
dissent more accurately portrayed the record, the considerable sparring in
the opinions over the proper perception of the facts and their
constitutional implications enhances the probability that the battle lines
of futureunitarybusiness controversies will be drawnoversuch factual
issues."
96. 100 S. Ct. at 1232 (citations omitted).
97.TheCourt seems to have taken special pains to note that
"appellant hasmade noeffort to demonstrate that the foreign operations of
its subsidiaries andaffiliatesare distinct .. . " Also:"In the
absence of any proof of discrete business enterprise .. ." (100S. Ct. at
1232, 1233). See also Walter Hellerstein "Dividing the State Corporate
IncomeTax Base," at n. 614.
98. This is not tosay that I think the outcome in Mobil wasproper.
Based on the reasoning of note 914 above, I have elsewhere characterized the27.
decision in Mobil as a "travesty." See alsoMcLure, "Uniformity in
Interstate Taxation."
99. 100 S. Ct. at 12141, ri.10.
100. 102 S. Ct. at 3135.
101. Ibid., p. 3136.
102. Ibid., p. 3139.
103. Ibid., p. 31140.
1014. 102 S. Ct. at 3111—3112. Although ASARCO owneda majority of
Southern Peru, It elected only six of thirteen directors.The other owners
elected six directors, and the thirteenth was electedby the first twelve.
Eight votes were required to pass any resolution. Millernotes in
"Worldwide Unitary Combination" that in a Californiacase ASARCO was held
not to control Southern Peru. As a result, therewas no unitary bisiness
and the two firms could not be made to file a combinedreport.
105. Ibid., p. 3113.
106. Ibid., p. 31114,quotingthe state's brief.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid., pp. 3117—3119.
109. Ibid., pp. 3120—3121.
110. Ibid., p. 3121. O'Connor emphasized the vetopower ASARCO held
in the case of Southern Peru, the potential to electa director where it
had never done so, and the fact that ASARCO remained thelargest
shareholder in the Mexican subsidiary.
111. For more on this issue, see JeromeHellerstein, "State Taxation
Under the Commerce Clause," and Walter Hellerstein,"Dividing the State
Corporate Income Tax Base." I should note that I do not thinkthat states
should tax intercorporate dividends. See alsoMcLure, "Uniformity in28.
Interstate Taxation."
112. 14117U.S.at 223; 100 S. Ct. at 2120(quotingMobil OilCorp.v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 100 S. Ct. at 1232).
113. 102 S. Ct. at 3115 n. 22.
1114. Walter Hellerstein, "Dividing the State Corporate Income Tax
Base."
115. Ibid.